



Iraqi Neighbors' Stance on Kurdish Independence Referendum of 2017: Iran and Turkey

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Abstract

This paper is to evaluate the stance of both Iran and Turkey on the independence referendum of the Iraqi Kurds, 2017. This has been done by reviewing several articles that have, partly, highlighted the stance of Iraqi neighboring countries on the issue. It is, therefore, a survey-like study to find out why and how these states were against the step. While the Kurdish attempt for independence was backed by several historical reasons and realistic opportunities, it faced failure. Iran and Turkey, as two Iraqi neighbors that have a considerable number of Kurdish populations inside their borders, played a crucial role in defeating the step. The point here is that, globally, while Western powers were against Iran's behavior, agreed with it in facing the referendum. Besides, regionally, while Iran and Turkey had lots of issues regarding the Syrian crisis, they agreed on taking joint steps against the referendum. This means that the regional powers and the international community agreed on protecting Iraqi territorial integrity by violating the Kurdish right to self-determination. The fact is that Iran and Turkey's fear of spillover effects of the referendum on their population was a realistic one, to an extent. However, the unaddressed question is that nulling the referendum did not solve the Kurdish dilemma in the Middle East. Additionally, the referendum has become another issue to challenge the new world order which, in theory, is based on international law and principles; and, in practice, it is based on the interest of great powers. The Kurdish issue, in both theory and practice, is a problematique one for the international community. Here, the conflict of interests is between the stateless nations who want to become independent and the current states who want to protect their territorial integrity.

Keywords: Iraq, Iran; Turkey; KRG; Independence Referendum; Territorial Integrity.

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Introduction and Methodology:

This paper is to analyze and evaluate the stance of both Iran and Turkey on the Iraqi Kurds' independence referendum of 2017. This is a review article that would be done by reviewing several articles that have tried to highlight the stance of the two mentioned Iraqi neighboring countries on the issue. It is, therefore, a focused literature review, or a survey-like study to find out why and how these states were against the step. The analyzed literature is that of those researches that have been conducted on the regional and global reactions toward the step. It is to understand the behaviors of the others on the Iraqi Kurds' unilateral referendum of independence, which was held on 25 September 2017. Here, the focus will be on Iran and Turkey's responses by analyzing how their foreign policy machine functioned. The paper would be conducted by reviewing focused literature and centering on some selected articles; namely one which is written by Zhao Changfeng and Otenia Temitayo who tried to illustrate the causes and impacts of the 2017 Iraqi Kurdistan's independence referendum independence. In terms of methodology, the present study would be conducted within the framework of qualitative data analysis. The data, moreover, would be the focused literature, and the selected articles; thus, the whole paper is like a literature review. This would be done in such a way because of the nature of the study as a review article.

On 25 September 2017, the independence referendum was held. It was supported by the majority of Kurdish people, NGOs, political parties and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG); it was also ratified by the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament. The vote, however, was a unilateral step as rejected by the federal government of Iraq, Iraqi neighboring countries, and the international community too. The referendum's question was Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistan areas outside the administration of the Region to become an independent state? The result was that, with a turnout of %72, more than %92 cast their vote in favor of independence (O'Driscoll & Baser, 2019). Here, it should not be ignored that even those Kurdish people and political parties who were against the step and voted No in the referendum were supporting Kurdish independence, but their matter was related to the time that it should be declared. Their slogan in the referendum campaign was not No, but 'No for Now', which implicitly means Yes for independence, but not now (See: Park, et al, 2017; and Eccarius-Kelly, 2018). On 15 October, Iraqi armed forces, including Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) launched a military attack to take the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and took Kirkuk. Later, on 25 October, KRG announced that it is going to 'freeze' the results of the referendum. On 6 November, the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court made a decree on the illegality of the vote and KRG showed its respect for the court's decision (See: Charountaki, 2020).

The main argument that Changfeng and Temitayo (2018) want to build is that the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurds is backed up by several historical reasons and realistic opportunities. However, it was opposed by the regional and global powers - more specifically by Iraqi neighbors, including Iran and Turkey. The authors argue that the referendum is linked to the Kurdish issue which is long haunted in the Middle East, and to the Kurdish long struggle for building their own nation-state that has had an impact on the international relations of the region. They believe that the reactions of the neighboring Iraqi countries towards the 2017 referendum were "mainly due to the fear of spillover effects on their populations and the impact on the Middle East" (p. 59).

Changfeng and Temitayo (2018) try to refer to a background to support their argument. They make it clear that "the Kurdish issue mainly refers to the Kurdish people's aspiration for independence or autonomy and has a long past in the Middle East. The genesis of the problem can be linked to the era after the First World



War. The ones to blame are the European colonial powers” (p. 59). They add that Kurds are the world’s largest stateless nation and have conducted several actions aiming at founding their state. They add more and state that “although these attempts have failed, they have profoundly affected the political situation in the Middle East. [...] Northern Iraq is the first region to be the most impacted and to have been the stage for the Kurdish national independence movement.” (p. 59). It is where the authors linked the referendum of Iraqi Kurds to all other Kurds around the region and the globe. By doing this, they try to build an argument saying that the issue is not only of the Iraqi Kurds - but of all the Kurds; and consequently, it is not only of Iraq - but of all countries which are having Kurdish populations inside their borders (See: Gunter, 2021). In doing so, the referendum could not be considered a domestic issue of Iraq, but extends into its neighbors and the region too.

Changfeng and Temitayo followed their plan by structuring their research in a way that started by mentioning several chronological issues related to the Kurdish issue in what so-called enlarged Kurdistan. They argue that there are historical reasons for Iraqi Kurds to hold an independence referendum. This simply means that the dream is an old one that Kurds have never let go of and have never given it up. Besides, they argue that the 2017 referendum is backed up by some realistic opportunities which made the Kurds think that it was the time to do so. The authors try to analyze the rise of the Islamic State (The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham - ISIS) as the main reason that the Kurds benefitted from it to take a further step towards their independence, aiming at founding their independent state. Their analysis is the one that they try to not forget any historical and de facto impacts on the case. However, what they forgot, in terms of methodology, is that the study lacks a theoretical framework to back its argument and enrich its analysis.

In analyzing the responses of the global community, Changfeng and Temitayo (2018) classified the responses into three main reactions. Nonetheless, these classifications are not categorized based on the levels of international relations but based on the nature of the stance and response toward the independence referendum. They simply classify the responses into opposing parties, supportive party - which they believe that it was Israel, and ambiguous one - considering Russia. Regarding the first group, the authors classify the group into three more sub-groups based on different themes, but not a unified criteria or measurement. The first sub-group, within the opposing group, is four Middle Eastern countries which are Iraq and three Iraqi neighbors that embrace a Kurdish minority inside their own countries - Iran, Turkey and Syria. The second sub-group is considering global great powers, those that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and enjoy having the right to Veto - the United States and China. The last sub-group within the opposing parties is an international organization - the United Nations.

Methodologically, the way the authors classify the states could be considered a big issue, as it is not based on a specific criterion; it is, however, a multi-measurement method. While for some fields such as history it is something sort of acceptable, for the field of political science and international relations studies, it is not. The problem here is that while almost all kinds of responses have been taken as examples, they have been taken based on different criteria. To make it even clearer, it can be argued that putting an international organization, like the United Nations, along with a great power, like China, into a framework, is a problematic issue - in terms of methodology. Nevertheless, this classification has its advantages too; as it does not limit itself to the clichés and the formality of writing, but lets it go to an extent that would be able to highlight and achieve what the authors search for.



Changfeng & Temitayo (2018) try to explain why and then how Iran and Turkey, just like Iraq, opposed the independence referendum of the Iraqi Kurds. They argue that this act is linked to ‘the unity and partition of Iraq’ and it goes even further and beyond that. This argument has been clarified by the Iraqi federal government’s warnings which described the referendum as a ‘strategic and historic mistake’. On the 27th of September 2017, two days after the referendum vote, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi called on Kurdish authorities to cancel the results of the referendum (Changfeng & Temitayo, 2018, p. 62). Besides, the fear, fear of partition, was not limited to Iraq alone, but to its neighbors that have a Kurdish population in their respective countries too. That was why they also, just like the Iraqi state, opposed the independence referendum strongly. They thought that this would be having great spillover impacts on nationalist and separatist tendencies in their countries. This, of course, would not be limited to Kurdish separatists alone, but to other minorities too - such as Arabs and Azeris in Iran.

Iran’s Stance on the Iraqi Kurdish Independence Referendum

Changfeng & Temitayo (2018) argue that the main reason for Iran’s opposition to the Kurdish independence referendum was that Iran, just like Turkey and Syria, looked at it from a security perspective. It also considered the referendum a threat to its national interest and territorial integrity. They add that “the Iranian government fears that an independence referendum in the Iraqi Kurdistan would exacerbate separatist tendencies and endanger its national security and territorial integrity. The Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, during a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said that Iraq is an independent sovereign state and that Iran would not accept any geographical changes” (2018, p. 62). Besides, the spokesperson of the Iranian foreign ministry stated that the referendum as a unilateral step would increase Iraq’s problems. Additionally, the secretary of the Expediency Council of Iran argued that the referendum “would have serious repercussions on the area that might divide both Syria and Turkey and put the region into a probably 20-year war”. He warned that “the Kurds will be the biggest victims in this situation and that such referendums stem from the individual desire of some Kurdish leaders, not a popular demand” (Hanish, 2018, p. 22).

The fact was that the referendum per se was a request to split Iraq into two separate states, and this could be considered an apparent threat to Iraq’s territorial integrity (See: Mohammed & Alrebh, 2020). This pushed the Iraqi federal government to take countermeasures. Iraq was confident in doing so, because, firstly, it is a sovereign state whose territorial integrity is guaranteed by international law; and secondly, it had strong regional and global support in protecting its unity, and that was what its neighbors looked for. Changfeng & Temitayo (2018) state that “for Baghdad, the referendum is unconstitutional, and the central government is working with its neighbors, Turkey and Iran, to gradually implement sanctions against Iraqi Kurdistan. In response to the results of the Kurdish referendum, Iraq’s Minister of Defense said that it would cooperate with Iran and Turkey to control the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan (including some oil-producing areas in the Kurdish-controlled Kirkuk province). Also, Iran has declared an air embargo on flights between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan” (p. 64). This can be concluded that Iran and its neighbors took several independent and joint countermeasures after the referendum. These could be classified into legal, diplomatic, economic and also military actions.

While Iraqi Kurdistan was regarded as a partner of Iran, which was having cultural, trade, political and even security-related ties; however, as Changfeng & Temitayo (2018) state, since the announcement of the independence referendum Iran voiced its strong opposition to the referendum. This was almost the same for Turkey.



Thus, both Iran and Turkey, based on their domestic politics, and aiming to protect their territorial integrity, worked along with Iraq to face the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurds, considered a common threat. Thus, as the authors documented, “an Iranian army’s spokesman announced that the Iranian and Iraqi central government’s forces would conduct joint military exercises along the borders between the two countries. Following his declaration, the Iranian and Iraqi central government’s troops held a joint military exercise near the border between the two countries, with Iraqi security forces stationed in the disputed areas controlled by the Kurds. On 26th September, Turkish and Iraqi armed forces held joint military exercises along the border areas of both countries” (2018, p. 65).

The fact is that, as Entessar (2018) argues, both Iran and the KRG are having commonalities of interests; however, “the desire of both sides to develop amicable and long-lasting relations between themselves, a variety of regional and domestic factors have served as impediments to the blossoming of Tehran-Erbil relations” (Entessar, 2018, p. 73). The 2017 independence referendum could be argued as one of these factors. He adds that these relations are ‘fluid, and even unpredictable’, and brings an example to clarify his argument, saying that “at times unforeseen developments, like the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) that threatens the interests of both Tehran and Erbil bring the two sides together in a marriage of convenience. When the IS forces had threatened the KRG, it was Iran that sent both military equipment and logistical support to Erbil and cooperated extensively with the KRG in military operations against their common enemy” (2018, p. 84).

For the Islamic Republic of Iran, guaranteeing its national interest, and territorial integrity is primary. Thus, when it is about facing a threat, even the economy does not matter. The fact is that Iran would never prefer economic and political ties over what it considers its national security issues. It is true that before the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran had good enough trade ties with the KRG - and to an extent and because of the US sanctions, Iran was more in need of it, but Iran joined Iraq and Turkey in imposing economic sanctions, including closing the borders with the KRG (Changfeng & Temitayo, 2018). In this regard, Huff (2018) argues that “one Iranian member of parliament had estimated \$2.5 billion in self-harm to Iran’s economy resulting from post-referendum sanctions” (p. 13).

The Iranian response was not limited to economic and political means, but extended to military ones too. To face the threat, Iran helped Iraq by all means. “On the night of October 15, columns of Iraqi forces and Iranian-backed militias maneuvered toward Peshmerga lines, setting the stage for a defining showdown. Vital strategic and economic points like the Kaywan Airbase and Baba Gurgur oil fields around Kirkuk fell in quick order, and the United Nations estimated that more than 180,000 were displaced by the five-day operation. Kurdish lines melted away with little resistance, which the American-led coalition described as coordinated movements, not attacks. The unforeseeable, historic setback happened in all of 15 hours” (Huff, 2018, p. 6). Changfeng & Temitayo (2018) add that “the ‘united front’ involving Iran, Iraq, and Turkey put Iraqi Kurds under a lot of pressure. The sanctions imposed by Turkey and Iran posed enormous challenges and threats to the economic development of Iraqi Kurdistan and the freedom and security of Kurds” (p. 65).

Turkey’s Stance on the Iraqi Kurdish Independence Referendum

Iraqi Kurdistan was regarded as a partner by Turkey which was having trade, political and security-related ties. However, as Changfeng & Temitayo (2018) state, since the announcement of the independence referendum



“Turkey has quickly shifted its stance and expressed its strong opposition to the independence referendum, fearing that the Iraqi Kurds’ initiative to pursue independence would have spillover effects over its Kurdish population.” That is why Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had very strong opposition and threatened that “the Iraqi Kurdistan would pay the price for an independence referendum that is widely opposed by the international community” (p. 62). This has been analyzed by the authors as the shift of Turkish attitude toward Iraqi Kurdistan based on Turkish domestic politics. However, the fact is that the relationship between Turkey and the KRG has always been under the shadow of this sort of issue.

It can be argued that Turkey recognized the KRG to be only an autonomous region within a unified Iraq, but not as an independent state. Therefore, for Turkey protecting a unified Iraq is the first step toward protecting its unity. It thinks that an independent Kurdistan will pave the way for increasing the political demands of Turkey’s Kurds, even if it was not about separation. The fact was that Turkey looked at the Iraqi Kurds’ independency from the perspective of ethnic, but not civic, nationalism. This means that Turkey did not let itself think about the case from a different perspective other than nationalism and security approaches. The reason that Turkey acted so, is partly because the Iraqi Kurds also stepped towards independence based on a nationalist view; thus, it might be faced with the same method. In addition, Turkish domestic policy is about functioning with the same method, where its public sphere is fully charged with Turkish nationalist, if not populist, tendencies (See: Park, 2019).

The relations between Turkey and KRG were always designed based on mutual, pragmatic, interests. As Huff (2018) argues «trade with the KRG carried heavier importance for a troubled Turkish economy. One possible factor may have been the more than \$4 billion loan from Turkey to the KRG, which Baghdad would be unlikely to assume in the event the KRG folded up. For its part, the KRG still made consistent monthly payments to oil companies despite the severe fiscal crisis.” He adds that the whole story is not about the trade, but also “Turkey was willing to accept the KRG ‘devil’ they know compared to the Iranian-backed militias representing Baghdad and Tehran, two actors with which Ankara has had its share of friction” (Huff, 2018, p. 14). Furthermore, concerning all of these commonalities of interest, Turkey thought about its prestige, and hegemony, in the region. Once more, it was time for Turkey to play the role of a regional power that can protect its interests and also the interests of others in the region.

Turkey, not surprisingly, would never prefer its economic and political ties with the KRG over what it considers its national security. It is true that before the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey had close trade, security and political ties with the KRG, and the KRG’s economy strongly relied on exporting oil via Turkey to the global oil market. However, because of the referendum, Turkey joined Iraq and Iran “to restrict the political activities of Iraqi Kurds through economic means, such as imposing an embargo on oil exportation from Iraqi Kurdistan and halting or reducing trade with the autonomous region. After the referendum, Turkey imposed a ban on oil from the autonomous region, causing economic losses to Erbil” (Changfeng & Temitayo, 2018, p. 65). Besides, the Turkish response to the referendum was not limited to economic and political means, but it was also extended to military ones. As Changfeng & Temitayo (2018) state, Turkey and Iraq held joint military maneuvers on their borders. The Turkish Air Force targeted some bases of the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK, in Iraqi Kurdistan, killing 13 members of the PKK. They add that the joint plans of Iraq, Turkey and Iran in putting pressure on the KRG were successful. They could cause huge losses to the KRG economy, security and political stability - as well as to KRG residents’ psychology.



These military actions of Turkey, and others by Iraq along with Iran, were part of the trilateral understandings of those countries. Hanish (2018) explains this by analyzing a military meeting; he states that “the Turkish warning coincided with a sudden move by the Iranian chief of staff, who arrived in Ankara to discuss several files, mainly the Kurdish referendum according to the Turkish media reports.” He adds that this military-intelligent coordination between Turkey and Iran was to unite efforts against the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurdistan because there was fear of encouraging Turkish and Iranian Kurds to secede. Hanish argues that “Turkey and Iran, even though they have been busy about who should govern Syria, are seeking to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey, Iran and Syria, all inhabited by large numbers of Kurds, strongly oppose Kurdistan’s independence from Iraq” (2018, p. 22).

Further Discussions and Conclusion

As a result, it can be argued that Iraq and its neighbors are having a number of diplomatic, strategic and geopolitical dilemmas in their relations. They are, however, united in facing threats to their territorial integrity. When it is about protecting each other’s territorial integrity, they work and act in harmony – considering commonalities of interest. This is simply because Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria are considered each other’s strategic depth. The Kurdish issue is one of those which they think is not only a domestic one. In other words, the Kurdish case is considered as a single one between these four countries, but not four different cases. However, the paradox here is that these four states have not tried to solve the problem in a unified manner. They could not solve it in one way or another, at all. Consequently, the failure of solving the Kurdish issue among the four states paved the way for external intervention of great powers into the mentioned countries and the region too.

Changfeng & Temitayo argue that the Iraqi, Turkish, Iranian and Syrian fear of the emergence of an independent Kurdistan was a real one. It can be, in a way, interpreted as a threat to their territorial integrity and “sparking a new wave of separatist sentiments among the other Kurds and other ethnicities. [...] Iraq may experience tensions between Sunni and Shia populations leading to the creation of Shia and Sunni states. Same threats of partition are great concerns for Iran, Syria, and Turkey with their minorities” (2018, p. 65). Nevertheless, the other part of the story could be like the one that Hanish (2018) narrates, saying that “Iran is the main opponent of secession, believing that the establishment of an independent Kurdish state on its borders could weaken Iraq under the Shiite leadership, fuelling Kurdish opposition in Iran, and becoming a hotbed for American and Israeli activities against the Islamic Republic. Iran’s way is to influence through division by supporting one Kurdish party against another, and putting Baghdad against the Kurds” (p. 22).

As Hanish (2018) concludes, “because of isolation and failure to get any world support and because of Iraqi government tough measures, in addition to neighboring countries of Turkey and Iran’s tough policies to isolate the region, the Kurdistan regional government confirmed its respect of the federal court interpretation of article 1 of the constitution, indicating its willingness to solve disagreements with Baghdad in constitutional and legal manners” (p. 21). Nowadays, as Zartman (2017) argues “sovereignty at the lower level is best displayed by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq. [...] No other Middle Eastern minority has edged so close to the second level of sovereignty, and no other minority has grasped so well the elements of territoriality and state structure; all it needs is sovereignty” (p. 941). This simply means that while the referendum has faced failure and its fate was that to be refuted, the KRG still has the potential to become an independent state. Furthermore, the Kurdish aspiration for independence is still there (See: Phillips, 2017; and Gunes, 2019). Thus,



if an independent Kurdistan has been interpreted as a threat to the others' national security and territorial integrity, then 'the threat' still is there. However, if this could be interpreted in a realistic, but not ideologist way, then it can be argued that 'the opportunity' to solve a long-rooted problem of the Middle East still is there.

Today, because of the new waves of new social movements, such as Arab uprisings, and new waves of militant organizations, such as the Popular Mobilization Forces - of Iraq, the Middle East is much more than before boiling. As Fawcett (2017) argues "the region has witnessed multiple regime changes alongside high levels of popular mobilization, violence and transnational activism. The results have been highly destabilizing, resulting in challenges, not only to regimes but also to the very sovereignty and territorial integrity of states" (p. 789). The problem, here, is that, as he adds "this situation, in turn, has contributed to a shifting regional balance of power and repeated episodes of external intervention" (Ibid, p. 789). Then, once more, it looks like the time has come for the peoples and states of the region to solve their own problems, avoiding more external interventions.

Going back to the main article, Changfeng & Temitayo's article is a good contribution to the related field of study. Scholars from political science and international relations could benefit from it. Its significance is in that the authors used speeches of the presidential elites and governmental documents, along with media reports as sources of data. However, they could not bear a proper methodology such as discourse or content analysis. They just limited themselves to a narrative method by getting some help from descriptive ones. That is why their argument is not clear while trying to claim that the territorial integrity of the respected countries, including Iran and Turkey, was the most preferable value to fight for. Regardless of several methodological issues, the article is plausible and interesting. The problem has been pointed out and there were good enough attempts to address it, especially by focusing on historical linkages of the issue.

The findings of the article, as have been summarized in the Conclusion, are about opening a new debate; it reads that "although the United Nations Charter recognizes the people's right to self-determination, it has always brought a dilemma and endless debate in international relations. This dilemma lies in the conflict of interests between those who wish to free themselves and those who do not wish to lose parts of the territory. Who is right? Who is wrong?" They replay that "the answer depends on different considerations, such as historical facts, academic beliefs, geopolitical stakes, and so on. If external forces get involved, the problem becomes more complicated. The latter often decide to support the parties with whom they have interests to protect or where they can get better gains" (Changfeng & Temitayo, 2018, p. 66). While the authors have conducted a debate on related issues, such as the geopolitics of the Middle East, territorial integrity, security and peace, and the war on terror, the fact is that these arguments have not been backed by a proper theoretical or conceptual framework.

پوخته:

ئەم توێژینهوهیه بۆ هه‌ڵسه‌نگاندنی کاردانه‌وهی ئێران و تورکیایه به‌رامبه‌ر به‌ ریفراندۆمی سه‌ربه‌خۆیی کوردی عێراق، ٢٠١٧. ئەمه‌ش به‌ پێداچوونه‌وه به‌ چه‌ند باب‌ه‌تیک کراوه که به‌شیکێ تیشکیان خستۆته سه‌ر هه‌لۆیستی ولاتانی دراوسێی عێراق له‌ سه‌ر پرسه‌که. بۆیه توێژینه‌وه‌یه‌کی هاوشیوه‌ی سی‌رفه‌ی سه‌ر توێژینه‌وه‌کانی دیکه‌یه بۆئه‌وه‌ی بزانی‌ت بۆچی و چۆن ئەم ده‌وله‌تانه‌ دژی ئەو هه‌نگاوه‌ بوون. له‌ کاتیکدا هه‌ولێ سه‌ربه‌خۆیی کورد به‌ چه‌ند هۆکاری میژوویی و ده‌رفه‌تی واقعی پالپشتی ده‌کرا، به‌لام رووبه‌رووی شکست بووه‌وه. ئێران و تورکیا وه‌ک دوو دراوسێی عێراقی که ژماره‌یه‌کی به‌رچاو له‌ دانیش‌توانی کورد له‌ ناو سنووره‌کانیدا هه‌یه، پۆلیکی



چاره نووسازیان هه بوو له شکستی پێهتانی ئه وه ههنگاوه. مه به ست لێره دا ئه وه یه، له ئاستی جیهانیدا، له کاتیکدا زلهیزه کانی پوژئاوا دژی پهفتاره کانی ئێران بوون، له پروبه پروبوونهوهی ریفرا ندۆمدا له گه لێدا هاو رابوون. جگه له وهش له پرووی ناوچه ییه وه له کاتیکدا ئێران و تورکیا پرسیکی زۆریان هه بوو سه بارهت به قهیرانی سووریا، به لām له سه ر گرتنه بهری ههنگاوی هاو بهش له دژی ریفرا ندۆم ریککه وتن. ئه مهش به و مانایه یه که زلهیزه کانی ناوچه که و کۆمه لگه ی نێوده وه له تی له سه ر پاراستنی یه کپارچه یی خاکی عێراق له ریکگه ی پیشیلکردنی مافی چاره ی خۆنووسینی کورد ته با بوون. راستییه که ئه وه یه که ترسی ئێران و تورکیا له کاریگه رییه به ربلاوه چاوه روانکراوه کانی ریفرا ندۆم له سه ر دانیشتوانه که یان ترسیکی واقعی بوو، تا راده یه ک. به لām ئه و پرسیا ره ی که نه کراوه ئه وه یه که پووچه لکردنه وه ی ریفرا ندۆم پرسی کوردی له رۆژه لاتنی ناوه راست چاره سه ر نه کرد. سه ره رای ئه وهش، ریفرا ندۆم بۆ ته پرسیکی دیکه بۆ ته حه دای سیسته می نوێی جیهانی که له پرووی تیۆرییه وه له سه ر بنه مای یاسا و بنه ما نێوده وه له تیه کان دامه زراوه؛ له پراکتیکیشدا، له سه ر بنه مای به رژه وه ندی زلهیزه کان دامه زراوه. پرسی کورد، هه م له تیۆر و هه میش له پراکتیکدا، پرۆبلیماتیکه بۆ کۆمه لگه ی نێوده وه له تی. لێره دا ململانیی به رژه وه ندییه کان له تیوان ئه و نه ته وه بۆ ده وه له تانه دایه که ده یانه وه ییت سه ره به خۆ بن له گه ل ئه و ده وه له تانه ی ئیستا که ده یانه وه ییت یه کپارچه یی خا که که یان بپاریزن.

و شه ی سه ره کی: عێراق، ئێران، تورکیا؛ حکومه تی هه رێم؛ ریفرا ندۆمی سه ره به خۆیی؛ یه کپارچه یی خاک.

المخلص:

ته هدف هذه الورقة إلى تقييم رد فعل كل من إيران وتركيا على استفتاء الاستقلال لأكراد العراق، ٢٠١٧. وقد تم ذلك من خلال مراجعة العديد من المقالات التي أبرزت جزئيًا موقف الدول المجاورة للعراق من هذه القضية. وبالتالي، فهي دراسة شبيهة بالدراسة الاستقصائية لمعرفة لماذا وكيف كانت هذه الدول ضد هذه الخطوة. في حين أن المحاولة الكردية للاستقلال كانت مدعومة بعدة أسباب تاريخية وفرص واقعية، إلا أنها واجهت الفشل. لعبت إيران وتركيا، باعتبارهما جارتين عراقيتين لديهما عدد من السكان الأكراد داخل حدودهما، دورًا حاسمًا في هزيمة الخطوة. والمقصود هنا أنه في الوقت الذي كانت فيه القوى الغربية ضد سلوك إيران، اتفقت معها في مواجهة الاستفتاء. إلى جانب ذلك، على الصعيد الإقليمي، في حين كان لدى إيران وتركيا الكثير من القضايا المتعلقة بالأزمة السورية، اتفقتا على اتخاذ خطوات مشتركة ضد الاستفتاء. وهذا يعني أن القوى الإقليمية والمجتمع الدولي اتفقت على حماية وحدة أراضي العراق بانتهاك حق الأكراد في تقرير المصير. الحقيقة هي أن خوف إيران وتركيا من تداعيات الاستفتاء على سكانهما كان واقعيًا إلى حد ما. لكن السؤال الذي لم تتم معالجته هو أن إلغاء الاستفتاء لم يحل المعضلة الكردية في الشرق الأوسط. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، أصبح الاستفتاء قضية أخرى لتحدي النظام العالمي الجديد الذي يقوم، من الناحية النظرية، على القانون والمبادئ الدولية؛ ومن الناحية العملية، فهي تقوم على مصالح القوى العظمى. إن القضية الكردية، نظريًا وعمليًا، هي إشكالية للمجتمع الدولي. هنا، صراع المصالح هو بين الاقوام عديمة الدولة التي تريد أن تصبح مستقلة والدول الحالية التي تريد حماية سلامتها الإقليمية.

كلمات مفتاحية: العراق، إيران، تركيا؛ حكومة إقليم كردستان؛ استفتاء الاستقلال؛ السلامة الإقليمية.



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